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After the Arab Spring

Revolt and Resilience in the Arab Kingdoms
Zoltan Barany
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Abstract: The eight Arab kingdoms, aside from Bahrain, have
weathered the Arab Spring with remarkable ease when compared to
presidential republics. What explains the relatively modest upheaval
and the ruling elites’ success in preserving the status quo? This article
suggests that the popular legitimacy of the region’s monarchies complemented by fragmented political opposition and deep social cleavages limited the appeal of radical revolt.

E

ven a perfunctory survey of the states where the Arab Spring
was marked by mass demonstrations and substantial violence—
Tunisia, Egypt, Yemen, Libya, Syria, and Bahrain—reveals that,
with the exception of the last, they are all presidential republics. North
Africa and the Middle East is also home to eight Arab monarchies, from
Morocco on the Atlantic Ocean to the emirates on the Persian Gulf, that
have escaped the brunt of the upheaval that rocked the region since early
2011. Why have these states been seemingly immune to major revolts?
How have their rulers responded to popular demands for reform? What
explains their overall success in preserving the status quo and keeping the
agents of radical change at bay?
Seven of the eight Arab monarchies—Jordan, Kuwait, Morocco,
Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates (UAE)—
have managed to stave off the recent turmoil. The eighth, Bahrain, a
tiny island off the coast of Saudi Arabia, is the notable exception: it is the
only Shi’a-majority population Arab monarchy ruled by a Sunni Muslim
royal dynasty and it has experienced considerable unrest. The endurance
of the Arab kingdoms is all the more remarkable because only a few
decades ago experts entertained serious doubts regarding their longterm survival. After the end of royal rule in Egypt (1952), Iraq (1958),
Yemen (1962), and Libya (1969), it did seem that the days of the Arab
monarchies were numbered. Royal rule was threatened by coup attempts
(Saudi Arabia and Morocco) and civil war (Jordan) but the only Middle
Eastern monarch unseated in over three decades was not an Arab king
but the Shah of Iran.
A number of scholars explored the reasons behind the survival of
the Arab monarchies prior to the Arab Spring. These studies explained
the monarchies’ resilience through their unique historical backgrounds
and their success in spreading family members throughout senior posts
across governmental and security agencies—a trait that led to widespread revulsion when nonmonarchs in Tunisia, Egypt, and Libya tried
the same thing.1 In this context, then, it is tempting to consider the Arab
Spring as a major test to the endurance of the Arab world’s remaining
1     See, for instance, Lisa Anderson, “Absolutism and the Resilience of Monarchy in the
Middle East,” Political Science Quarterly 106, no. 1 (Spring 1991): 1-15; and Michael Herb,
All in the Family: Absolutism, Revolution, and Democracy in the Middle Eastern Monarchies
(Albany: SUNY Press, 1999).
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kingdoms, a test that, with the exception of Bahrain, they passed with
remarkable ease. How to account for their success not just to survive but,
perhaps more importantly, to continue to resist introducing substantial
political reform? The challenges to these states, which range from virtually none in the United Arab Emirates to large-scale protests aiming to
unseat the regime in Bahrain, were as different as the states themselves.
Four factors that explain the successful management of the political challenges in 2011 pertain to all Arab monarchies save for Bahrain.
First, protesters in the kingdoms wanted reform and not revolution as
in Tunisia or Egypt. Instead of calling for the abolition of the royal
regimes, activists sought a shift from absolute to constitutional monarchies. Second, opposition forces in all of these states were largely
disorganized and fragmented; consequently, their capacity to offer a clear
alternative or to bring about change was heavily compromised. Third,
as in other contexts, the fear of widespread disorder that accompanied
regime collapse in states like Libya and Yemen reduced the appeal of
radical approaches. Lastly, security forces avoided the overreaction seen
in several Arab republics and performed their tasks effectively without
causing excessive casualties.
Several explanatory variables are unique, however, to the different
kingdoms. Most importantly, given their vast financial reserves, the
prosperous dynastic monarchies of the Gulf were able to buy social
peace with economic incentives and expensive social programs accompanied by minimal, if any, political concessions. In Morocco and Jordan,
on the other hand, rulers needed to rely on political skills because their
resources were inadequate to purchase sociopolitical tranquility, even if
they were financially assisted by Saudi Arabia and other Gulf kingdoms.
Both continued their decade-long practice of promising major political
reforms while in reality making only modest concessions.
In this article, I first discuss the main thrust of the Arab Spring
as experienced in the Gulf and examine how the royal governments
reacted to it and why, with special attention to the outlier, Bahrain. In the
second section, focus shifts to Morocco and Jordan and why these two
states could quickly defuse threats to their political stability and preserve
their rule with only minor concessions. My argument is that, while the
Gulf kingdoms’ stability, given their plentiful financial reserves, appears
assured in the foreseeable future, the rulers of Jordan and Morocco need
to make real concessions to safeguard their long-term rule.

The Arab Spring in the Gulf Kingdoms

Compared to the full-blown uprisings elsewhere in the Arab world,
two of the Gulf Cooperation Council’s member states (Qatar and the
UAE) were essentially unaffected by turmoil while two others (Oman
and Saudi Arabia) faced only minor demonstrations. In Kuwait, however,
important political red lines were crossed although they have not shaken
the emir’s hold on the country. Bahrain, where the Al-Khalifa family’s
rule has been challenged and threatened, is the outlier.

Political Mobilization

In the richest Gulf state, Qatar, no demonstrations took place at
all. A few activists criticized the emir’s pro-Western foreign policy but
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the main domestic threat remained the long-standing infighting within
the several thousand strong Al Thani ruling family. In the UAE, some
intellectuals signed a petition demanding free elections to the Federal
National Council, the main federal authority of the country. In Oman,
small groups of approximately 200 demonstrated, at first mostly in the
port city of Sohar but later in the capital, Muscat, as well. Most protesters
sought jobs, pay raises, and anticorruption measures but a few called for
a new constitution leading to a parliamentary monarchy.2
The Arab Spring was rather more eventful in Saudi Arabia and
Kuwait. Both countries have substantial Shi’a Muslim minorities: in
Saudi Arabia they make up approximately 10-15 percent of the population (2.8-4.2 million) and 33 percent in the Eastern Province while in
Kuwait they number about 800,000 (30 percent).3 Organizers promised a “Day of Rage” in Saudi Arabia that never materialized due to
the extensive deployment of security forces.4 On numerous occasions
in the spring and fall of 2011, in the Eastern Province town of Qatif,
several hundred demonstrators called for the end of religious discrimination, the expansion of women’s rights, and the lifting of restrictions
on freedom of speech.5 The reduction of unemployment, particularly
youth unemployment, was another common demand of demonstrators
(39 percent of Saudis between the ages of 20 and 24 are unemployed).6
Of the five states considered in this section, only Kuwait can be
said to have anything resembling an organized opposition. The ruling
Al Sabah family introduced quasi-representative institutions to serve as
safety valves for dissent and in the past decade the National Assembly
has become a dynamic and occasionally raucous body. It is permitted
to “grill” cabinet ministers and, since 2009, has even included female
members. As the legislature’s political authority gradually increased,
the ruling elites have become somewhat more accountable to the
citizenry.7 Starting in February 2011, a number of the country’s relatively independent nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) organized
demonstrations to demand political reforms, to dismiss the unpopular
prime minister, and to denounce the mismanagement of public funds
and growing income inequalities.
Elsewhere in the Gulf states, opposition groups, if they exist at all,
have no coordination and are divided over several fundamental issues,
starting with the concessions they expect from the state. Most importantly, demonstrators did not call into question the kingdoms’ basic
political and economic arrangements. Instead, they sought political
2     David Sorenson, “Transitions in the Arab World: Spring or Fall?” Strategic Studies
Quarterly 5, no. 3 (Fall 2011): 24; and Marc Valeri, “Oman,” in Power and Politics in the Persian
Gulf Monarchies, ed. Christopher Davidson (New York: Columbia University Press, 2011), 58.
3     Joshua Teitelbaum, “The Shiites of Saudi Arabia,” Current Trends in Islamic Ideology 10
(August 2010): 73 (also available at www.hudson.org).
4     Kristian Coates Ulrichsen, “Saudi Arabia,” in Power and Politics in the Persian Gulf
Monarchies, 86.
5     Marina Ottaway and Marwan Muasher, “Arab Monarchies: Chance for Reform, Yet
Unmet,” The Carnegie Papers—Middle East (Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for
International Peace, December 2011), 16.
6      F. Gregory Gause III, Saudi Arabia in the New Middle East (New York: Council on Foreign
Relations, Special Report # 63, December 2011), 7.
7     See Michael Herb, “A Nation of Bureaucrats: Political Participation and Economic
Diversification in Kuwait and the United Arab Emirates,” International Journal of Middle East
Studies 41, no. 3 (2009): 375-395.
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changes such as electoral reform; an independent judiciary; guarantees
of freedom of expression; removal of corrupt cabinet members; and
some economic concessions. The demonstrations were small, peaceful,
and nonconfrontational.

State Responses

Even though the protests signified only modest domestic challenges
to the dynastic monarchies, their governments left nothing to chance.
The most widely used approach was to buy social peace through awarding cash bonuses, lowering food prices, creating jobs, and providing
housing. The sovereign wealth funds of these rentier states allowed them
to make major concessions to their populations, an option not available
to their less fortunate fellow rulers in Morocco and Jordan
In Kuwait, every citizen received $3,500 in February 2011 and the
emir announced basic food items would be free until March 2012.8 The
government approved a record budget of $70 billion, most of which was
set aside for fuel subsidies and salary increases for public employees,
including military personnel.9 Nonetheless, demonstrations continued
and, in November 2011, culminated in the storming of the National
Assembly building by demonstrators and some members of parliament.
Later that month the emir accepted the resignation of the much-criticized prime minister, Sheikh Nasser Al-Sabah, and his cabinet, thereby
satisfying one of the key demands of the opposition. Sultan Qaboos of
Oman mollified the protesters by concessions such as making several
personnel changes in his government, removing corrupt ministers, and
introducing unemployment benefits. Bowing to popular pressure, he also
announced a number of amendments to the Basic Law.10 Nevertheless,
the limited personnel reshuffle and the token reforms did not address
the concentration of near-absolute power around the Sultan nor did they
stop the expression of discontent manifested by continuing waves of
strikes and unprecedented public criticisms of Sultan Qaboos.
Qatar’s rulers made a similar gesture when they announced that
in 2013 two-thirds of the seats of its Consultative Assembly will be
contested. Other concessions included expanded political rights for
women and a constitutional amendment to split the powers of the prime
minister from those of the emir—although both of them are senior
members of the ruling family.11 In the relatively calm UAE, the government committed $1.55 billion to infrastructure improvements and made
arrangements with food suppliers to keep prices low. More importantly,
the number of eligible voters for the September 2011 Federal National
Council elections was raised from 6,000 to nearly 130,000. The barely
28 percent turnout rate seemed to indicate, however, that citizens were
“either not interested in political participation or considered the advisory body to be meaningless.”12
8     Lin Noueihed and Alex Warren, The Battle for the Arab Spring: Revolution, Counterrevolution, and the Making of a New Era (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2012), 250.
9     Liam Stack, “Seeking to Avoid Uprising, Kuwait Escalates Budget,” The New York Times,
June 30, 2011.
10     Noueihed and Warren, 251; Valeri, 135; and Ottaway and Muasher, 19.
11     Jennifer Lambert, “Political Participation and Reform in Qatar: Participation, Legitimacy,
and Security,” Middle East Policy 18, no. 1 (Spring 2011): 90.
12     Noueihed and Warren, 251.
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In terms of financial enticements, the Saudi government went even
further than its neighbors. In February 2011, it took preemptive action,
promising to spend $37 billion on raising civil service salaries, and
building low-income housing units even before protests broke out in
its troubled Eastern Province. Following demonstrations there, Riyadh
earmarked an additional $93 billion for various socioeconomic projects,
including the creation of 60,000 government jobs.13 Furthermore, the
kingdom announced, starting in 2015, women will be allowed to participate in municipal elections and will be eligible for appointments to the
Shura Council, an advisory body to the king.14
Besides using the carrot to alleviate tensions, the Gulf Cooperation
Council (GCC) states also employed the stick when necessary. Regular
armed forces were seldom involved in suppressing demonstrations; that
task was executed by regular police and security forces. Only in Oman did
the need arise to deploy the country’s highly professional and restrained
military. Police personnel, particularly in the richest Gulf kingdoms,
are often composed of citizens of less prosperous Sunni Muslims from
Jordan, Yemen, and Pakistan (especially from Balochistan). The police
were ordinarily reinforced by various security forces or the equivalent of
a National Guard, while the regular armed forces stayed in their barracks.
As elsewhere, military personnel in the Gulf kingdoms abhorred the
idea of involvement in internal police operations against demonstrators.
The GCC, as the main political and security organization of the oilrich Arab monarchies, played an active role in responding to upheaval
in member states and beyond.15 The Council promised a $20 billion aid
package to two of the less wealthy member states, Bahrain and Oman, to
finance development projects to alleviate social discontent. The GCC’s
most important activities during the Arab Spring targeted Bahrain and
the two nonmember Arab monarchies.

The Bahrain Exception

The fundamental reason Bahrain has been such an outlier is that the
Al Khalifa family lacks any legitimacy with the majority of the country’s
citizenry. Bahrain is a Sunni Muslim state with a Shi’a Muslim majority population. According to the 2010 census, 56 percent of Bahrain’s
population are foreigners, while its citizenry is composed of 60 percent
Shi’a and 40 percent Sunni Muslims, though most sources put the
Shi’a’s proportion closer to 70 percent.16 The ruling elites—the royal
family, members of political and business circles, and virtually the entire
military-security establishment—are Sunni who have marginalized
those of the Shi’a Muslim creed. Many Sunnis believe that the Shi’a are a
potential fifth column for Iran that, if given a chance, would replace the
state with a Shi’ite theocracy. In Manama, the Bahraini capital, a major
13     Neil MacFarquhar, “In Saudi Arabia, Royal Funds Buy Peace for Now,” The New York
Times, June 8, 2011.
14      Saudi Arabia: Women To Vote, Join Shura Council,” Human Rights Watch, September
26, 2011.
15     On intra-GCC dynamics, see Matteo Legrenzi, The GCC and the International Relations
of the Gulf (London: I.B. Tauris, 2011).
16     Steven Cook, “Fear and Loathing in Bahrain,” Council on Foreign Relations blog,
April 28, 2011, http://blogs.cfr.org; and for the 70 percent population figure: Foucraut, Elsa.
“Consequences of the Political Deadlock in Bahrain on Reforms in the Gulf,” NOREF Report
(Norwegian Peacebuilding Centre, April 2011), 2.
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uprising began with a decidedly sectarian character on 13 February 2011.
The royal family responded with a $2,700 grant to every Bahraini family,
but this gesture did not stifle the accumulated frustrations and energies
of the demonstrators. On 17 February, the regime changed tactics and
resorted to violence—security forces used rubber bullets and tear gas
on peaceful demonstrators, many asleep at what had become something
like a street fair, killing at least four and injuring many.17 In response,
the uprising escalated and took a decidedly antimonarchical character, in
spite of King Hamad’s offers of dialogue and the government’s release
of some political prisoners. Some continuing demonstrations were quite
large, with over 100,000 people (from a population totaling less than 1
million) participating.18 The regime, no longer confident of its ability
to restore peace, asked for the GCC’s assistance which arrived on 14
March, consisting of over 1,500 security troops from Saudi Arabia and
the UAE. On the following day, King Hamad declared martial law. The
GCC contingent secured strategic locations and buildings while domestic forces suppressed resistance. Following the fierce repression of the
protests, however, a growing proportion of the Shi’a community shifted
support to radical opposition activists, emblematized by the Coalition of
February 14th Youth. Their principal objectives are to liberate Bahrain
from Saudi occupation, overthrow the Al Khalifa regime, and let the
population choose their own political and economic system.19
At least forty-six people died in the conflict, including some police
officers. Approximately 3,000 people were arrested, 700 of them were
still behind bars at the end of 2011, and over 4,000 lost their job as a
result of participating in the conflict.20 In June, the king lifted the state
of emergency and appointed M. Cherif Bassiouni, an independent ArabAmerican legal expert, to head the newly created Bahrain Independent
Commission of Inquiry (BICI). The commission was tasked to investigate the security forces’ handling of the protests. BICI’s surprisingly
candid report, broadcast to the nation in November 2011, charged the
regime with violating human rights; using excessive force in breaking
up protests; torturing demonstrators in custody; and punishing the Shi’a
community collectively.21 The king promised to consider the report’s
recommendations and dismissed the head of Bahrain’s much criticized
National Security Agency, Sheikh Khalifa bin Abdullah, a member of
the ruling family. Since then, some lower-level policemen were held
responsible but sentences against the uprising’s leaders were upheld and
only token reforms have been introduced, though the government has
signaled substantive changes to come.22
17     Kenneth Katzman, “Bahrain: Reform, Security, and U.S. Policy,” (Washington, DC:
Congressional Research Service, March 2011), 5.
18     Katja Niethammer, “Calm and Squalls: The Small Gulf Monarchies in the Arab Spring,”
in Protest, Revolt, and Regime Change in the Arab World, ed., Muriel Asseburg, (Berlin: Stiftung
Wissenschaft und Politik, 2012), 15.
19     Toby Jones, “Bahrain’s Revolutionaries Speak: An Exclusive Interview with Bahrain’s
Coalition of February 14th Youth,” Jadaliyya, March 22, 2012, www.jadaliyya.com.
20     “Arab Spring? That’s the Business of Other Countries: Interview with King Hamad of
Bahrain,” Der Spiegel, 13 February 2012, www.spiegel.de.
21     “The King’s Risky Move,” The Economist, November 26, 2011; Toby Jones, “We Know
What Happened in Bahrain: Now What?” SADA Journal (CEIP), 1 December 2011.
22     See “No Progress, No Peace,” Bahrain Centre for Human Rights (September 18, 2012);
“Turning a New Page in History,” Gulf Daily News, 13 December 2012; “Bahrain’s Top Court
Upholds Sentences Against Uprising Leaders,” The New York Times, January 7, 2013; and
author’s interviews with opposition activists and regime supporters in Bahrain (December 2012).
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There is, of course, an important regional dimension to the turmoil
in Bahrain, which is also a proxy conflict between Saudi Arabia and
Iran.23 First, the Saudi state has a tremendous influence on Bahrain,
which is only accessible on land from Saudi Arabia through the 15-milelong King Fahd Causeway. Second, the Saudis are understandably
worried about the effect of Bahrain’s Shi’a uprising on their own large
Shi’a minority in their Eastern Province where, incidentally, the bulk
of the country’s oil deposits are. Third, Shi’a-majority Iran, the Sunni
monarchies’ arch enemy, has not only been keenly interested in the fate
of its religious brethren in Bahrain but Iranian officials have claimed
Bahrain as Iran’s province in public statements.24

Morocco and Jordan: The Shrewdness of Kings

Not having the financial resources to purchase social peace, King
Mohammed VI of Morocco and King Abdullah II of Jordan responded
to demands for reform with tactics they have long mastered: manipulation, co-option, and minor concessions masked as major reforms. They
projected willingness to compromise and carefully calibrated the actions
of their coercive agencies to avoid the clumsy overreaction of other
rulers in the region.

Political Mobilization
The two countries share a history of regime-tolerated protests,
usually occasioned by socioeconomic grievances, starting in the 1990s.
The first major Arab Spring demonstration in Morocco took place on 20
February 2011, organized on Facebook by a youth group that called itself
February 20th Movement for Change. On that day, 150,000 to 200,000
Moroccans took to the streets in 53 towns and cities across the country.25
Smaller, mostly uncoordinated, demonstrations continued for months.
The protests in Jordan started as, and for the most part remained, sit-ins
after the Friday prayers. As in Morocco, individual demonstrations
remained relatively small. The largest demonstration occurred 24-25
March and attracted approximately 7,000 to 10,000 people,26 nothing
like the mass rallies in Tunis or Cairo. In fact, according to a Jordanian
poll, 80 percent of respondents did not support the protests, 55 percent
thought they led to chaos, and 15 percent viewed them as unnecessary
and useless.27
The participants in the Moroccan demonstrations were mainly
young, educated, and urban middle class men and women. The mostly
co-opted political parties, with the partial exception of the fringe United
Socialist Party (PSU) and the banned Islamist group, Justice and Charity,
not only did not participate but actually advised their youth organizations
23     See Simon Mabon, “The Battle for Bahrain: Iranian-Saudi Rivalry,” Middle East Policy
19, no. 2 (Summer 2012): 84-97.
24     See, for instance, “Bahrain as ‘Iran’s Fourteenth Province’,” The Telegraph, February
17, 2011; for background, see Edward Gordon, “Resolution of the Bahrain Dispute,” American
Journal of International Law 65, no. 3 (July 1971): 560-568.
25     See “Ça ne fait que commencer…,” Tel Quel, February 26-March 4, 2011, 24-25.
26     Sarah Tobin, “Jordan’s Arab Spring: The Middle Class and Anti-Revolution,” Middle East
Policy 19, no. 1 (Spring 2012), 101.
27     Samuel Helfont and Tally Helfont, “Jordan: Between the Arab Spring and the Gulf
Cooperation Council,” Orbis 56, no. 1 (Winter 2012): 90.
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to stay away. Once Justice and Charity became involved, however, the
February 20th Movement started to lose momentum because many activists worried the Islamists would hijack the demonstrations.28 Moreover,
following the constitutional referendum and the expedited parliamentary
elections, the Movement saw its popularity decline which, in turn, was the
main reason Justice and Charity withdrew its support in October 2011.
In Jordan, the demonstrators were urban intellectuals, tribal-based
people from the south, and members of the moderate Islamist Action
Front (IAF), the political wing of the Muslim Brotherhood, which is
well integrated into Jordan’s political landscape. The deep social divide
between Transjordanians and Jordanians of Palestinian origin effectively
limited the protests because few Palestinians would join demonstrations
that, to a considerable extent, were directed against their ostensibly disproportionately large influence on the state.
The protesters demanded socioeconomic programs and political
reforms. Marchers carried signs asking for jobs, effective antipoverty
measures, social justice, and condemning rising food and fuel prices,
and the endemic corruption in public life. Jordan’s King Abdullah II
received plenty of criticism: he is considered by many to be far too
Westernized and tolerant of the extravagant lifestyle of his Palestinianborn wife and the shady business deals of her relatives.29 Although no
one publicly suggested abolishing the monarchy, many activists in both
countries appealed for new electoral laws and elections. Many voiced
their desire for a parliamentary monarchy in which “the king reigns but
does not rule.” Divisions in the opposition ran deep in both countries;
ultimately, protesters could agree only on their disapproval of authoritarian rule. Major disputes between incrementalists who were afraid to
appear too radical and those who called for rapid and sweeping reforms
could not be resolved.30

State Responses
There are many similarities in the Moroccan and Jordanian regimes’
reaction to the protests. Both states allowed peaceful demonstrations
under heavy police presence. When rallies threatened to become too
unruly, when the organizers were not known to the authorities, or when
the location of the protests was inconvenient—for instance, a demonstration could not be contained to a certain area or it could paralyze
a business or government district—both regimes clamped down with
security forces and progovernment thugs (baltagiya) causing a number
of casualties.31
Morocco’s king quickly realized the protests posed a potentially
serious test of his rule and, brilliantly, placed himself at the forefront of
reform taking the momentum away from the opposition. Mohammed
VI played Morocco’s Arab Spring skillfully, staying a step ahead of and
outsmarting the opposition at ever juncture. In his now-famous 9 March
28     February 20th Movement leaders, interview by author (Rabat and Ifrane), April 2012.
29     See, for instance, Helfont and Helfont, “Jordan,” 89.
30     Anouar Boukhars, “The Lesson from Morocco and Jordan: Reform or Perish,” Middle
East Institute, September 1, 2011, www.mei.edu.
31     Tobin, “Jordan’s Arab Spring,” 101-102.

After the Arab Spring

Barany

97

2011 speech, the king, not wanting to alienate politically moderate activists, acknowledged the validity of the protesters’ demands. He made
several gestures to strategically important groups such as unions, unemployed university graduates, and political parties. The king appointed a
constitutional commission headed by one of his advisers and a panel of
intermediaries between the constitution’s drafters and political parties,
nongovernmental organizations, human rights organizations, labor
unions, etc. Much of this was just a ploy, however, since no substantive
consultation took place.32
On 17 June, the monarch introduced the new constitution and
announced a national referendum on it only two weeks later. Such a
tight schedule made it impossible for the opposition to seriously analyze
the draft let alone to organize a public debate on it. In the meantime, the
regime unleashed a major media campaign and pressed political parties,
imams, and local authorities to urge people to vote and to vote “yes”
on the new constitution. The operation succeeded: on 1 July 2011, 73.5
percent of eligible voters went to the polls and, apparently, 98.5 percent
of them endorsed the document.33 The new constitution extends official
recognition to the Tamazight language (spoken by the Berber minority), grants citizens access to an independent constitutional court, and
requires the monarch to select prime ministers from the members of the
party that won the election.34 Still, the king remains unaccountable to
any institution and free of legal constraints on his power. He still heads
the armed forces, the constitutional court, and, as Commander of the
Faithful, is the spiritual leader of the country’s Muslims. In sum, the
new constitution, though announced with much fanfare, offered few
substantive improvements and made little difference in the fundamental
nature of the absolute monarchy. This was a perfect example of topdown constitutionalization.
Jordan’s King Abdullah II is less popular and rules a far weaker
state than Mohammed VI. He, too, correctly calculated that he could
take the sting out of the opposition movement by showing flexibility and
promptly addressing the protesters’ demands. He promised $500 million
to increase public sector salaries, raised the minimum wage, augmented
fuel subsidies, removed unpopular prime ministers (three in fifteen
months),35 met with leaders of the Muslim Brotherhood, visited strategically important constituencies, and formed a committee to prepare a
new electoral law and to consider constitutional reforms. Moreover, he
played to public sentiments by detaining the shamelessly corrupt former
chief of the intelligence service.
In June 2011, the team of constitutional experts presented 42 mostly
minor changes to the constitution. If anything, there was even less public
debate on this constitutional reform than in Morocco. The amendments
established a constitutional court, restricted the government’s power
32     Driss Maghraoui, “Constitutional Reforms in Morocco: Between Consensus and Subaltern
Politics,” Journal of North African Studies 16, no. 4 (December 2011): 679-699.
33     “Morocco Approves King Mohammed’s Constitutional Reforms,” BBC News Africa, July
1, 2011, www.bbc.co.uk.
34     André Bank, “Jordan and Morocco: Pacification through Constitutional Reform?” in
Asseburg, Protest, Revolt, and Regime Change, 32.
35      See, for instance, Ranya Kadri and Ethan Bonner, ”King of Jordan Dismisses His Cabinet,”
The New York Times, February 1, 2011; Hani Hazaimeh, “Khasawneh Resigns; Tarawneh To
Form New Gov’t,” Jordan Times, April 27-28, 2012.

98

Parameters 43(2) Summer 2013

to issue temporary laws, limited extrajudicial trials, created an election
oversight committee, and restrained the power of the shadowy State
Security Court. Other than losing the ability to indefinitely postpone
elections, no restrictions were placed on the king’s authority.36
The long-delayed and much-anticipated electoral law, passed in
June 2012, also proved controversial. Although it increased seats in the
Chamber of Deputies from 120 to 140 and expanded seats reserved for
women from 12 to 15, all members of the Senate continue to be royal
appointees. Uniformed personnel of the military-security establishment
are allowed to vote for the first time. The opposition roundly decried the
new law because it gives every voter two votes, one for a local candidate
and one for political parties on a closed proportional representation list.
They claim this favors pro-government loyalists as only 17 seats can be
contested by party and coalition candidates.37 The Muslim Brotherhood,
by far the most influential opposition movement, announced the Islamic
Action Front, its political arm, planned to boycott the elections scheduled for December 2012.38
The political concessions, including the constitutional changes and
the electoral reforms, did not alter the distribution of political power in
the two monarchies in any appreciable way. The lack of truly independent political institutions also means that even if they were interested in
substantive changes, the kings would not have any reliable institutional
partners with whom to pursue them until they allowed such institutions
to develop freely.

Implications for the United States

For decades now, and particularly since the First Gulf War and
9/11, the Arab monarchies have been reliable allies of the United States;
with the passage of time these relationships have become infused with
more substance. The kingdoms’ for-the-most-part restrained reaction to
the recent protests has further confirmed their importance as strategic
allies. This is not to say Washington does not have areas of concern
with the kingdoms. For instance, Saudi Arabia was sharply critical of
US policy that evolved to support the Arab revolutions, in particular the
uprising in Egypt. In fact, Riyadh threatened to bankroll the Mubarak
administration if Washington withdrew its support and, once the regime
in Cairo fell, offered financial aid to the military-led transitional authority, the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces.39 Qatar, on the other
hand, took an independent role in shaping the international response to
the civil war in Syria and Yemen, urged the Arab League to support the
United Nations-sanctioned action against Gaddafi’s crumbling regime

36      Marwan Muasher, “Jordan’s Proposed Constitutional Amendments—A First Step in the
Right Direction,” Carnegie Endowment Commentary, August 17, 2011.
37     Kristen Kao, “Jordan’s Ongoing Election Law Battle,” SADA Analysis on Arab Reform,
July 5, 2012, http://carnegieendowment.org.
38     Hend Tarek, “Jordan Opposition Moves To Boycott Elections,” Daily News Egypt, June
25, 2012.
39     Kamrava, “The Arab Spring,” 98-99.
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in Libya, and committed its own F-16 aircraft to the North Atlantic
Treaty Organization (NATO)-led bombing campaign.40
The bottom line is the Arab monarchies, given their political stability (with the notable exception of Bahrain) and the views they share with
Washington with regard to the threat of Islamist extremism, remain
solid pillars of US foreign policy in a complex and difficult region.
One of the ways cooperation between the monarchies and the United
States has deepened is through military-to-military contacts, a growing
number of joint maneuvers and training courses between elements of
the US Central Command and the armies of the Arab monarchies, and
an expanding contingent of Arab military officers participating in educational programs in the United States and in other NATO countries,
particularly the United Kingdom and France. Senior officers of the
Gulf armies confirm the value of such programs and the role it plays in
increasing their professionalism.41
Bahrain is a special case not only because of its dubious distinction
of being the only monarchy with serious domestic security challenges,
but also because it has provided a home to the US Navy’s Fifth Fleet
since 1995. In March 2011, Secretary of Defense Robert Gates visited
Manama and held talks with King Hamad and Crown Prince Salman.
He urged the Bahraini government to exercise restraint in its response to
the demonstrators. Gates and other American politicians have warned
that if Manama did not introduce political reforms to diminish the
marginalization of the Shi’a community, the ensuing instability might
strengthen the appeal of radical opposition groups and create a fertile
ground for Iran to interfere and create more chaos.42 The radicalization
of the Bahraini opposition was not inevitable; in large part it was the
result of the heavy-handed and uncompromising attitude of ruling elites.
American politicians, including Secretary Gates and former Secretary of
State Hillary Clinton, encouraged moderate, gradual political reforms to
address the grievances of Bahrain’s Shi’a majority.43

Conclusion

Compared to the full-fledged revolutions of several Arab republics,
the kingdoms of the region have experienced only mild upheaval. The
turmoil has been relatively minor because the monarchies have been
able to respond with a mixture of financial incentives, coercive action,
and modest political concessions to whatever challenges were posed
to them. Furthermore, external diplomatic, financial, and security aid
augmented ruling elites’ ability to cope with the unrest.
The Gulf monarchies were positioned to counter the mostly feeble
challenges they faced with economic incentives. They also made minor
40     Guido Steinberg, “Qatar and the Arab Spring,” German Institute for International and
Security Affairs, SWP Comments 2012/C 07 (Berlin: Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, February
2012), 1; interview by author with Arab League officials (Tunis, 3 December 2011) and Elsadig
Elfaqih, Secretary General of the Arab Thought Forum (Amman, April 26, 2012).
41     Military officers in Gulf states, interviews by author (December 2012).
42     Miriam Joyce, Bahrain from the Twentieth Century to the Arab Spring (New York:
Palgrave Macmillan, 2012), 117.
43      Ali Alfoneh, “Between Reform and Revolution: Sheikh Qassim, the Bahraini Shi’a,
and Iran,” American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, No. 4 (July 12, 2012): 8;
author’s interview with Bahrain’s Ambassador to the United States (Washington, DC, 8 January
2013).
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political concessions that posed no risk to their power, and, in the rare
cases when it was necessary, forcefully repressed challenges to their
authority.44 It appears, at least in the near-to-medium term, the royal
families of the Arabian Peninsula will be able to follow this tactic to
maintain their rule: they sit on approximately 46 percent of the world’s
proven oil reserves and, more crucially, have a production-to-reserve
ratio of approximately 90 years.45
What about the two resource-poor monarchies? The purchasingsocial-peace approach is obviously well beyond their capabilities. In
2011, both Morocco and Jordan managed protests with what seemed
like a model of reasonableness.46 There is, however, a wide gap between
the actual political performance of Morocco and Jordan and the mostly
positive notice they gather from Western leaders. The political reforms
Mohammed VI and Abdullah II offered were not reforms; they were
little more than gestures, ploys, and short-term solutions to alleviate
social tensions. They are unlikely to change the two countries’ political
landscape in any meaningful way. Moroccan and Jordanian political elites
have taken no real steps to solve the fundamental and long-standing
political, social, and economic problems their regimes face: acute rural
poverty, rampant corruption, inadequate political rights, and limitations
on social mobility, among others.
The big question, then, is just how long can the rule of the Moroccan
and Jordanian royal families be sustained without implementing major
political, economic, and social reforms. The monarchs in Rabat and
Amman are locked in what Samuel Huntington called the “king’s
dilemma.”47 They must introduce meaningful reforms expeditiously to
prevent more dangerous socio-political upheavals in the future, yet that
reform process might lead to the collapse of their regimes. Assuming
the opposition keeps the pressure up, the best strategy for these two
kings is the slow but steady, step-by-step devolution of their absolute
power leading to a constitutional monarchy in the next fifteen to twenty
years. They are in a much more favorable situation than the Shah of
Iran was before promoting his white revolution, or Mikhail Gorbachev
at the beginning of glasnost and perestroika. Neither Reza Pahlavi nor
Gorbachev enjoyed anything near the sort of deep-rooted domestic
support that continues to surround Mohammed and Abdullah. That
support, however, will not last indefinitely: “prestige” the great Tunisian
thinker Ibn Khaldun warned, “decays inevitably.”48 It needs to be complemented and enriched with real reforms that would grant citizens a
stake in the long-term survival of these monarchies.
In the meantime, the United States government should continue to
advocate thoughtful and incremental political and economic reforms
that contribute to the monarchies’ stability and diminishes the appeal of
radical political, social, and religious forces and ideas. Military-to-military
44     Niethammer, 16.
45     Legrenzi, 69.
46     Ahmed Benchemsi, “Morocco: Outfoxing the Opposition,” Journal of Democracy 23, no.
1 (January 2012): 57.
47     Samuel P. Huntington, Political Order in Changing Societies (New Haven, CT: Yale
University Press, 1968), 177-191.
48     Ibn Khaldun, The Muqaddimah: An Introduction to History (Princeton, NJ: Princeton
University Press, 1969), 105.
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contacts, training courses, shared maneuvers, and cooperation in a
number of areas have played a beneficial role in the professionalization
of the Arab monarchies’ officers. One can be confident that maintaining
and, if possible, expanding these programs, will be an excellent investment in this region, so crucial for American national interests.

